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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
         The appeal in this longshoreman's personal injury case requires 
us to consider 
once again the contours of the "active" operations duty, as developed in 
the caselaw flowing 
from the landmark case Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 
U.S. 156 
(1981), and to apply it to the facts of a stevedoring accident.  The 
plaintiff is John Serbin, 
who, as the sun was rising on December 28, 1992, struggled to move a stuck 
piece of 
equipment — known as a "snatch block" — on the ship he was helping to 
unload.  Unable to 
complete the job, Serbin attempted, with a coworker, to set it down, but 
he was thrown from 
the crates he was standing on to the deck seven feet below, breaking his 
knee in the fall.  
Serbin sued in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
under section 5(b) of 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b), 
alleging 
negligence of the vessel's crew that was attributable to the defendant 
ship.  The district court 
granted summary judgment for the ship.  Because there is a genuine issue 
of material fact as to 
whether the ship breached the active operations duty, we reverse and 
remand for further 
proceedings. 
          
                 I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
         Serbin was a longshoreman employed by Independent Pier Company, a 
stevedore operating in the Port of Philadelphia.         Beginning at 
about midnight on 
December 28, 1992, Serbin's longshore gang began unloading fruit from the 
M/V Atlantic 
Universal, a vessel owned by defendant Bora Corp. LTD (the "ship").  The 
ship's cargo hold, 
where the fruit was located, is divided into hatches and decks.  Each 
hatch, like a silo, runs 
vertically through the ship; each hatch is also split horizontally into 
five decks about seven feet 
high.  Cargo, in this case fruit, is bundled into units approximately 
seven feet high so that 
each unit can fit into a deck.  Separating the decks are movable hatch 
covers, like double 
doors, that form the floor and ceiling of the decks.   
         The ship's crew opens and closes these hatch covers with a block 
and pulley 
system.  Using a crane, the crew pulls a cable that runs through four 
snatch blocks — one in 
each corner — and then attaches to the hatch cover.  After the 
longshoremen remove the unit 
of cargo from the highest deck, the crew uses the block and pulley system 
to fold open the 
next hatch cover, exposing the unit of cargo in the deck below.  The 
snatch blocks, the 
moveable pulley part of the system, can pivot up (vertical position) and 
down (horizontal 
position) around hinges that attach them to the sides of the hatch covers.  
In order to open the 
hatch covers, the snatch blocks must be in the down (horizontal) position.  
After the hatch 
covers have been opened, the blocks must be returned to the up (vertical) 
position in order to 
allow the removal of the cargo below.  The crew then ties the blocks to 
hold them in the up 
position.  Each block weighs approximately one-hundred pounds.  Unlike 
most snatch blocks, 
which are portable, the blocks on the M/V Atlantic Universal were fixed to 
the hatches and 
had metal projections extending from their hinges that served as stoppers.  
As with the hatch 
covers themselves, moving the snatch blocks is the responsibility of the 
crew.             
          
         At around 7:00 in the morning on December 28, Serbin returned 
from a 
"dinner" break to resume unloading the No. 3 hatch of the M/V Atlantic 
Universal, which had 
been loaded by another stevedore in Chile.  Serbin, a forklift driver, was 
responsible for 
moving the fruit to the middle of the hatch, where a crane could lift the 
cargo out of the ship.  
As he descended to one of the lower "tween" decks, Serbin noticed that 
most of the cargo in 
the middle of the exposed deck had been unloaded, but that some units 
remained in the 
"wings."  He also noticed that one of the snatch blocks improperly 
remained in the down 
position, resting on top of one of the cargo units.  Serbin concluded that 
the unit of cargo 
underneath the block could not be removed while the block was in a down 
position, at least 
without damaging the top box of fruit.  Serbin also believed that the 
block was unsafe where it 
was because "that's where the hookup man would normally stand in the wing.  
If anything was 
to fall he had no place to run."  App. 39A.  Therefore, he decided to move 
the block back to 
the up position.  
         Serbin decided that he should move the block himself instead of 
waiting for the 
crew to do it, he testified, for two reasons.  First, "the fruit system 
has gotten very 
competitive on the East Coast.  With that in [the] way we wouldn't be able 
to send any fruit 
out and we would have had to wait for the crew to come down and move it 
and that would 
have been a waste of time, so I figured I can save time by moving it."  
Second, he had moved 
blocks in the past without difficulty, albeit sometimes with the help of a 
fellow longshoreman, 
and saw no reason why he should have any problem in this case.   
         When Serbin tried to move the block, he found that he could not 
do so by 
himself.  He asked another longshoreman, John McGonigle, who was working 
in the hold 
below, to help him raise it.  McGonigle, incidentally, had notified a crew 
member when he too 
had noticed the problem.  See infra p. 24.  At all events, using a 4" x 4" 
piece of wood that 
was lying on the deck, McGonigle attempted to push the block from below, 
while Serbin, 
standing with one foot on top of the unit, tried to lift the block from 
above.  They discovered 
that together they could still move the block only a little bit.  As they 
attempted to set the 
block down, McGonigle lost control of the 4" x 4", the block snapped back 
down on top of the 
unit, and Serbin was catapulted off the top of the unit onto the deck 
below.  Serbin suffered a 
severe knee injury in the fall — a tibial plateau fracture — that has 
permanently disabled him 
from working as a longshoreman.   
         In addition to his and McGonigle's testimony, Serbin offered the 
affidavits of 
two maritime experts:  George Mara, a naval architect and marine surveyor; 
and James 
Muldowney, an experienced stevedore ship boss.  These experts opined that 
the block had 
become stuck on the underlying unit when the ship's crew failed to ensure 
that the block path 
was unobstructed before closing the hatch covers after the fruit was 
loaded in Chile.  It was 
also the opinion of these experts that the crew should have discovered 
this condition both at 
the time it closed the hatch covers and the time it opened them in the 
Philadelphia port where 
Serbin worked.  In his complaint, under section 5(b) of the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), Serbin alleged negligence on the 
part of the ship's 
crew in failing to discover and correct the stuck block.  Defendant, the 
ship owner, moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that Serbin could not establish a breach of 
any duty.   
         The district court granted the motion.  Serbin v. Bora Corp., No. 
94-3030, slip 
op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1995).  It first reasoned that an issue of 
material fact precluded 
deciding whether the "active operations" or the "turnover" duty of the 
Longshore Act 
governed in this case.  Id. at 9.  Proceeding on the assumption that the 
active operations duty 
applied, the court reasoned that Serbin had failed to establish three of 
the four elements 
necessary to a prima facie case.  According to the district court, Serbin 
failed to show (1) that 
"a stuck block generally creates a hazard"; (2) that the condition of the 
block was not 
"obvious"; and (3) that the ship failed to take reasonable precautions 
because "[t]he vessel had 
established a mechanism for addressing problems with the blocks" and 
"[Serbin] attempted to 
fix the problem himself before the crew had a chance to remedy the 
problem."  Id. at  9-12.  
The district court concluded: 
         Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to establish that the 
         obstructed condition of the block presented a hazard that either 
         was known or should have been known to the crew.   As a result, 
         plaintiff cannot establish a breach of either the active 
operations 
         duty or the turnover duty.   
Id. at 14.  Serbin appeals.  The standard of review for summary judgment 
motions is well 
known and hence we relegate it to the margin.   
 
              II.  DUTIES UNDER THE LONGSHORE ACT   
         The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
905(b), 
establishes a comprehensive workers' compensation program for longshoremen 
and their 
families.  Section 5(b), the provision of the Act relevant for our 
purposes, provides 
longshoremen a cause of action for injuries resulting from the negligence 
of a ship or its 
crew.  However, the Act neither specifies what acts constitute negligence 
nor describes the 
duties owed by shipowners to longshore workers.  Instead, Congress 
intended that the scope of 
a shipowner's liability would evolve under general common law principles.  
See H.R. Rep. 
No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 
4704 ("Such 
issues can only be resolved through the application of accepted principles 
of tort law and the 
ordinary processes of litigation — just as they are in cases involving 
alleged negligence by 
land-based third parties.").  
         The Supreme Court set forth the basic framework for the Act's 
operation in 
Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).  "This 
duty extends," 
the Court explained, "at least to exercising ordinary care under the 
circumstances to have the 
ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced 
stevedore will be able 
by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operation with 
reasonable safety to 
persons and property . . . ."  Id. at 166-67.     
         As developed in Scindia and subsequent cases, the Longshore Act 
imposes three 
duties on shipowners:  (1) the "turnover" duty; (2) the "active 
operations" duty; and (3) the 
"intervention" duty.  The primary differences between these duties turn on 
scope of conditions 
or events for which the ship is responsible.  Which duty applies, in turn, 
depends on the 
timing of the cargo operation (i.e., has it begun?) and the control over 
the area or 
instrumentality in question (i.e., does the ship or the stevedore have 
control?).  The turnover 
duty comprises "both a duty to provide safe conditions and a corollary 
duty to warn of known, 
nonobvious hazards" in instrumentalities and areas "turned over" to the 
stevedore's control.  
Kirsch v. Plovidba, 971 F.2d 1026, 1028 (3d Cir. 1992).  For areas and 
instrumentalities 
remaining under the ship's control, the active operations duty includes 
the turnover duty, but 
also requires the ship, after unloading has begun, not to take negligent 
actions in areas under 
its control that threaten the longshoremen's safety.  See Davis v. 
Portline Transportes 
Maritime Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 1994).  Finally, the 
intervention duty 
requires the ship to take affirmative steps to rectify hazardous 
conditions even though it did 
not create the danger and even though the danger did not exist at the 
point of "turnover," at 
least when the ship has actual knowledge and the condition is not obvious.  
See Howlett v. 
Birkdale Shipping, 114 S. Ct. 2057 (1994).   
 
                         III.  DISCUSSION 
              A. Which Duty Applies?       
         The two arguably relevant duties in this case are the active 
operations duty and 
the turnover duty.  Serbin argues that the primary duty implicated here is 
the active operations 
duty.  The ship insists that it is the turnover duty.  The district court 
held that disputed issues 
of material fact precluded summary judgment on this issue.  We agree.  In 
order for the active 
operations duty to apply, Serbin must establish that the area in which the 
injury occurred, or 
the instrumentality which caused the injury, was under the substantial 
control of the vessel.  
See Davis, 16 F.3d at 540.  Serbin introduced evidence that the hatches 
and their snatch 
blocks (the instrumentality which allegedly caused his injury) remained at 
all times under the 
control of the crew.  Indeed, the crux of the ship's defense is that 
Serbin should have waited 
for the crew to take care of the problem.   
         With the exception of the "obviousness" inquiry, however, 
discussed infra, 
which duty controls is not important here:  if the block presented a 
hazard — whether through 
the turnover or the active operations theory — the ship breached its duty 
to Serbin.  Serbin has 
introduced evidence of the stuck block, and the ship has produced nothing 
that could support a 
conclusion that the block became stuck after Serbin's stevedore began 
unloading in 
Philadelphia.  Moreover, determining that Serbin could prevail on any 
theory will be enough 
to overcome the summary judgment against him.  Therefore, like the 
district court, we will 
analyze this issue as if the active operations duty applies.   
 
                 B. Did the Ship Breach Its Duty? 
         In order to establish a breach of the active operations duty, a 
plaintiff must 
show that the defendant "actively involve[d] itself in the cargo 
operations and [1] negligently 
injure[d] a longshoreman, or [2] [failed] to exercise due care to avoid 
exposing longshoremen 
to harm from hazards they may encounter in areas, or from equipment, under 
the active 
control of the vessel during the stevedoring operation."  Scindia, 451 
U.S. at 167.  In Davis, 
this Court elaborated on the "due care" requirement in prong 2 of the 
active operation duty, 
the aspect relevant here.  According to Davis, to establish a prima facie 
case of breach of the 
operations duty, a plaintiff must show:  
         (1) that the vessel appreciated, should have appreciated, or with 
         the exercise of reasonable care would have appreciated, the 
         condition; (2) that the vessel knew, or should have known, that 
         the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm to a longshore 
         worker; (3) that a longshore worker foreseeably might fail to (i) 
         either discover the condition or apprehend the gravity and 
         probability of the harm, or (ii) protect himself or herself from 
the 
         danger; and (4) that the vessel failed to take reasonable 
         precautionary or remedial steps to prevent or eliminate the 
         dangerous condition. 
16 F.3d at 541. 
 
1. Knowledge 
         The first factor Serbin must establish, and thus that we must 
evaluate, is 
whether "the vessel appreciated, should have appreciated, or with the 
exercise of reasonable 
care would have appreciated, the condition."  Id.  The district court 
concluded that Serbin had 
satisfied this prong of his prima facie test: 
         In this case, the plaintiff asserts that the "condition" at issue 
was 
         that the block was obstructed in such a manner that it could not 
         be rotated.  Accepting this characterization of the condition, I 
         conclude that the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence 
from 
         which a jury could conclude that the shipowner — by way of the 
         vessel's crew — knew or should have known that the block was 
         stuck.  As discussed above, there is evidence that the task of 
         moving the blocks fell to the crew.  Thus, a jury could find that 
         the crew in the normal exercise of their duties should have 
         discovered that the block was stuck.  In addition, in the hatch 
         where the accident allegedly occurred, three of the four blocks 
         apparently had been turned up; a jury might infer from this fact 
         that the crew had attempted to move the fourth block but found 
         that it was stuck.  It is therefore possible to conclude that the 
         crew had actual knowledge of the stuck condition of the block. 
Serbin, slip op. at 10.  We agree with the district court's reasoning in 
this respect.  In 
addition, Serbin introduced the affidavits of two experts who opined that 
the ship's crew 
should have discovered the stuck condition of the block both when it 
closed the hatches in 
Chile and when it opened them in Philadelphia.  Therefore, like the 
district court, we conclude 
that a reasonable fact-finder could determine that the ship's crew 
appreciated (or should have 
appreciated) the condition of the block. 
 
2. Unreasonable risk of harm 
         The second issue we must confront is whether Serbin presented 
evidence that 
could establish "that the vessel knew, or should have known, that the 
condition posed an 
unreasonable risk of harm to a longshore worker."  Davis, 16 F.3d at 541.  
The district court 
reasoned as follows: 
         Based on the record that has been presented, . . . a jury could 
not 
         conclude that the vessel should have known that the stuck block 
         presented an unreasonable risk of harm to longshore workers.  
         Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that suggests 
         that a stuck block generally creates a hazard and that this 
hazard 
         should have been known to the crew.  The only evidence I can 
         find in the record that an obstructed block is hazardous is the 
fact 
         that in this case the plaintiff was injured attempting to move 
it.  
         In order to establish that the condition was hazardous, however, 
         the plaintiff must show more than the mere fact that an accident 
         occurred.  On the record before the court, the situation 
         encountered by the plaintiff was hazardous not because the block 
         was stuck but because it was stuck in conjunction with the fact 
         much of the cargo on the deck had been removed, creating a hole 
         into which a longshore worker could fall.  In order for the crew 
         to appreciate that the obstructed block would present this risk 
of 
         harm, they would have had to anticipate that a longshore worker 
         would attempt to move the block after removing much of the 
         cargo.  No evidence in the record would support imputing this 
         knowledge to the crew. 
Serbin, slip op. at 10-11.  We disagree with this analysis in two major 
respects. 
         First, while a plaintiff certainly cannot rely on the mere fact 
that an accident 
happened to establish the existence of a hazard, the district court's 
discussion seems to suggest 
that a plaintiff must introduce specific evidence beyond the dangerous 
condition to show that 
that condition is generally hazardous.  We disagree.  This evidence might 
be helpful to a 
plaintiff's case, but it is not necessary.  For instance, a plaintiff 
could not rely on the mere fact 
that he fell on a staircase to prevail in a negligence suit against the 
owner.  But, if the plaintiff 
can show that the staircase was in disrepair, the jury is entitled to draw 
from that evidence the 
reasonable inference that the staircase presented a generally hazardous 
condition.  So too in 
this case.  Serbin need not introduce evidence about stuck blocks 
generally — but instead could 
rely on his evidence about this particular stuck block — if a fact-finder 
could draw the 
reasonable inference that the stuck block was a general hazard.   
         This brings us to our second point of disagreement with the 
district court's 
analysis:  whether a reasonable fact-finder could draw the inference that 
the hazard posed an 
unreasonable risk of harm.  Because Serbin must show that the block posed 
a general hazard, 
he is entitled to the inferences flowing from the many (i.e., general) 
ways a stuck block could 
injure someone.  See Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 
1369 (3d Cir. 1993) 
("The type of foreseeability that determines a duty of care . . . is not 
dependent on the 
foreseeability of a specific event."); Suchomajcz v. Hummel Chem. Co., 524 
F.2d 19, 28 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1975) ("The concept of foreseeability means the likelihood of the 
occurrence of a 
general type of risk rather than the likelihood of the occurrence of the 
precise chain of events 
leading to the injury."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(1) ("[T]hat 
the actor neither 
foresaw nor should have foreseen the . . . manner in which [the harm] 
occurred does not 
prevent him from being liable.").   
         It was not necessary, therefore, that the crew anticipate that "a 
longshore 
worker would attempt to move the block after removing much of the cargo."  
A stuck block 
could conceivably have injured someone in any number of ways.  For 
instance, to name just a 
few of the scenarios that could have occurred in Serbin's situation alone, 
the block could have 
(1) suddenly dislodged and sent him sprawling to the ground, causing 
serious injury even if the 
ground was not seven feet below; (2) snapped back and crushed his fingers 
underneath; or (3) 
having never budged despite Serbin's and McGonigle's efforts, seriously 
injured Serbin's back 
from the strain.  Thus, recognizing that the stuck block presented a 
general hazard would not 
require clairvoyance on the part of the crew that a longshoreman would 
hurt himself in this 
particular way.  A fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the crew 
should have recognized 
the general danger the stuck block posed.          
3. Foreseeable failure of longshoreman to protect against harm 
         The third question is whether Serbin introduced evidence that 
could support a 
fact finding that "a longshore worker foreseeably might fail to (i) either 
discover the condition 
or apprehend the gravity and probability of the harm, or (ii) protect 
himself or herself from the 
danger."  Davis, 16 F.3d at 541.  The district court explained: 
         For similar reasons, a jury could not find that a longshore 
worker 
         would foreseeably fail to (1) discover the condition, (2) 
         apprehend its gravity, or (3) protect himself or herself from the 
         danger.  Once having attempted without success to move the 
         block, a longshore worker could be expected to realize that the 
         block was obstructed.  In fact, the plaintiff acknowledges that 
         prior to the accident, he discovered that the block was stuck.  
He 
         attempted to move it by himself but, finding that he could not, 
he 
         called on his co-worker McGonigle for assistance.  The plaintiff 
         has thus presented no evidence that it was foreseeable that a 
         longshore worker would fail to discover the obstructed condition 
         of the block.  Similarly, the plaintiff has not produced evidence 
         that it was foreseeable that a longshore worker would fail to 
         appreciate the gravity of the block's stuck condition.  As 
         discussed above, the evidence that has been presented suggests 
         that the hazard associated with the stuck block existed only in 
         conjunction with the removal of the cargo below.  A longshore 
         worker attempting to move a stuck block while standing atop a 
         seven-foot stack of fruit boxes can be expected to appreciate the 
         danger of falling.  It is not foreseeable that such a longshore 
         worker would fail to protect himself from this danger. 
Serbin, slip op. at 11-12.  As this passage reveals, the district court's 
analysis of this prong of 
Davis essentially boils down to a test of "obviousness."  We agree with 
this characterization.  
See Davis, 16 F.3d at 543-44 (discussing this prong in terms of 
"obviousness").  But we 
disagree with the district court's conclusion for a number of reasons.   
         To begin with, this Court has consistently stated that 
obviousness is generally a 
question for the jury, not often appropriate for resolution by the court 
on summary judgment.  
See, e.g., id. at 540; Kirsch, 971 F.2d at 1030.  We think that reasonable 
minds could differ 
on whether an "obstructed" block presented an obvious danger under these 
circumstances, and 
that it is for the fact-finder, therefore, to decide the obviousness issue 
in this case.  
         Second, we believe that the record in this case does not 
establish, especially at 
the summary judgment stage, that Serbin knew the block was "obstructed."  
Serbin testified: 
         Q.   Did you start to move the block?  Because you mentioned that 
sometimesyou can move the block with just one person.   
          
         A.   Myself?  
 
         Q.   Yes. 
 
         A.   No.  That's why Johnny had to help me.  I couldn't move it 
myself. 
          
         Q.   Did you try to move it yourself first? 
 
         A.   Yes, and I couldn't do it. 
 
App. 54A-55A (emphases added). 
 
         John McGonigle, who helped Serbin try to move the block, 
testified: 
         Q.   [N]ormally — I'm not talking about the day of Mr. Serbin's 
accident — 
              when you lift a block like this, is it something that one 
person can do? 
 
         A.   No, usually two men. 
 
         Q.   When you usually do it, do you use any type of  
              equipment or did you just do it by hand? 
          . . . 
 
         A.   Yes, we did that a few times, different jobs. 
 
         Q.   Normally, would you use a four-by-four to lift the  
              blocks? 
 
         A.   Well, whatever you could find, a four-by-four, two-by-four.  
If there 
              was fruit or anything in the way, you could go over and pick 
it up with 
              the chisel (i.e. fork lift) forks. 
 
App. 78A-79A (emphasis added). 
         Therefore, Serbin testified only that he could not move the block 
by himself.  
He did not testify that it was "obstructed" — as opposed to being too 
heavy.  Moreover, he 
answered affirmatively that he could sometimes move a block himself, 
providing the 
reasonable inference that sometimes he could not move a block himself.  
The evidence does 
not, then, establish that Serbin knew that the block was "obstructed," 
i.e., stuck by metal 
stoppers wedged into the cargo below so that it would not move even with 
two men and a 
lever.  And McGonigle testified that moving a block was usually a two-man 
job, presumably 
because the blocks are heavy, and that it was not abnormal to use levers 
to augment the 
strength of the two men.  McGonigle's further testimony that other methods 
were available 
"[i]f there was no fruit or anything in the way" could possibly indicate 
that he had experience 
with this type of situation, that Serbin presumably shared this 
experience, and that the "fruit in 
the way" created an obstruction.  Or it could just indicate that the fruit 
barred one avenue of 
access to the block.  These questions of inference are for the fact-
finder.   
         Granting the reasonable inferences to Serbin, the testimony 
establishes that 
Serbin simply thought this to be a heavy block that would require 
additional assistance — 
including both more manpower and a lever — to move.  And a fact-finder 
could conclude that 
Serbin was reasonable in his assumption.  If Serbin reasonably did not 
apprehend the stuck 
condition of the block, he also would have no reason to take steps to 
protect himself against it.  
A disputed issue of material fact, therefore, precludes summary judgment 
on this issue. 
         The third reason we disagree with the district court's 
conclusions about 
foreseeable failure of the longshoreman to protect against harm is that, 
if the active operations 
duty applies, obviousness is not a complete bar to liability.  See Davis, 
16 F.3d at 543-45.  In 
Davis, we held that the potential obviousness of a danger — in that case a 
"grease and ice 
spot" — would not relieve a shipowner of its active operations duty to 
provide reasonably safe 
conditions under the Longshore Act, but rather could be taken into account 
in apportioning 
comparative negligence.  Id. at 540.  "[E]ven if we shared the district 
court's view that a 
reasonable jury must conclude that the danger was obvious, known to Davis, 
and easily 
avoidable," this Court said, "we still would not affirm its order granting 
[the defendant] 
summary judgment because we cannot conclude as a matter of law that [the 
defendant] was 0% 
and Davis was 100% at fault."  Id.  We concluded in Davis that both the 
structure and the 
legislative history of the Longshore Act demonstrated that Congress, in 
enacting the Act, 
rejected the common law tort doctrines of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk in 
favor of the admiralty concept of comparative negligence.  Id. at 544.  A 
complete bar to 
recovery for obvious dangers, we reasoned, would be inconsistent with the 
Act because it 
would effectively implement these outmoded and congressionally rejected 
doctrines.  Id.  
Rather, a ship could be at fault for failing to correct an unreasonable 
danger even if the 
longshoreman was also at fault for failing to avoid it:  "[I]t is 
fundamental that there may be 
more than one proximate cause of an injury."  Id. (quoting Moore v. M.P. 
Howlett, Inc., 704 
F.2d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
         The ship contends that a subsequent decision of the Supreme 
Court, Howlett v. 
Birkdale Shipping Co., 114 S. Ct. 2057 (1994), effectively overruled 
Davis.  We disagree.  
Howlett held that obviousness was a bar to liability under a different 
aspect of the Act — the 
turnover duty.  Under this duty, the ship need warn only of "latent 
hazards in the cargo stow," 
the Court said, because "[t]o impose a duty upon vessels to exercise 
scrutiny over a cargo 
loading operation to discover defects that may become hidden when the stow 
is complete 
would require vessels to inject themselves into matters beyond their 
ordinary province."  Id. at 
2066.  The Court made clear that the scope of the turnover duty with 
respect to the stow is 
"narrow" because "the cargo stow is separate and distinct from other 
aspects of the ship."  Id.at 2066-67.  In contrast, "[t]he vessel's 
responsibilities to inspect [the ship itself, and its gear, 
equipment and tools] are commensurate with its access and control."  Id. 
at 2066.  "Because 
the vessel does not exercise the same degree of operational control over, 
and does not have the 
same access to, the cargo stow," the Court concluded, "its duties with 
respect to the stow are 
limited by comparison."  Id. at 2067. 
         Thus, the Court held that, if the hazard in that case — a sheet 
of clear plastic in 
the cargo stow — was obvious to a competent stevedore, summary judgment 
would be 
appropriate for the ship.  Moreover, the seminal case in this area, 
Scindia, also suggested that 
the obviousness bar to liability under the turnover duty did not apply 
under the active 
operations duty.  Compare 451 U.S. at 167 (turnover duty:  "[I]f [the 
ship] fails at least to 
warn the stevedore of hidden danger which would have been known to him in 
the exercise of 
reasonable care, he has breached his duty . . . ." (emphasis added) with 
id. (active operations 
duty:  "[T]he vessel may be liable if it actively involves itself in the 
cargo operations and 
negligently injures a longshoreman or if it fails to exercise due care to 
avoid exposing 
longshoremen to harm from hazards they may encounter . . . .").  By 
omitting the modifier 
"hidden," the Scindia Court seems to have indicated that the active 
operations duty is not 
limited to nonobvious dangers.  In interpreting the Act as doing away with 
an "obviousness" 
bar to recovery under the active operations duty in Davis, we 
distinguished the narrower scope 
of the ship's responsibility under the turnover and intervention duties.  
16 F.3d at 537.  "This 
formulation lies in stark contrast to the rule applicable when the vessel 
does not actively 
involve itself in the cargo operations," we explained, "in which event the 
vessel may rely and 
depend on the experience and expertise of the stevedore."  Id.   
         Indeed, in Davis itself we recognized that this Court had already 
decided that 
obviousness was a bar to liability under the turnover duty:  "The focus on 
obviousness in 
Kirsch, 971 F.2d at 1031, was linked to the turnover duty and in Derr v. 
Kawasaki Kisen 
K.K., 835 F.2d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 
(1988), to the duty to 
warn; here, we must come to grips with the active operations duty, a duty 
which contrasts 
materially from the duties Derr and Kirsch considered."  16 F.3d at 540 
(citations omitted).  
We explained the different nature of the active operations duty: 
         When, however, the hazard occurs due to the vessel's active 
         operations, as is plausibly the case here, it no longer is proper 
         for the vessel to defer to the stevedore's expertise in handling 
         cargo.  The problem of apportioning responsibility between the 
         vessel and stevedore by manipulating the vessel's standard of 
         care to account for both entities disappears, because the vessel 
is 
         in such events responsible for the injury, and liability, if any, 
         should attach to it according to its comparative fault. . . . In 
         short, unlike with the turnover duty, which generally applies to 
         hidden defects in cargo areas, the vessel cannot rely on the 
         stevedore's expertise to protect its workers from the vessel's 
         active operations. 
Id. at 548 (emphasis added).     
         Thus, we conclude that a fact-finder could reasonably determine 
that the 
obstructed condition was not obvious.  We also hold that, if the active 
operations duty governs 
this case, obviousness will not bar liability, but rather will factor into 
a determination of 
comparative negligence. 
 
4. Reasonable steps to avoid harm 
         The final issue we must evaluate is whether the ship "failed to 
take reasonable 
precautionary or remedial steps to prevent or eliminate the dangerous 
condition."  Davis, 16 
F.3d at 541. According to the district court: 
         [P]laintiff has not shown that defendant "failed to take 
reasonable 
         precautionary or remedial steps to prevent or eliminate the 
         dangerous condition."  The vessel had established a mechanism 
         for addressing problems with the blocks: as the plaintiff 
         acknowledges, it had made it known that the blocks were the 
         province of the crew.  Indeed, the application of the active 
         operations duty proceeds, as discussed above, on the assumption 
         that the blocks were the responsibility of the crew.  McGonigle 
         had already alerted a crew member to the fact that one of the 
         blocks was in the down position.  Plaintiff, however, attempted 
         to fix the problem himself before the crew had a chance to 
         remedy the problem.  Plaintiff cannot show that defendant 
         breached the active operations duty, and this theory must be 
         rejected. 
Serbin, slip op. at 12.  We disagree.  Serbin contests that the vessel had 
not established a 
"mechanism" for dealing with block problems, and we can find nothing in 
the record to 
support the ship's and the district court's assertion that it did.  
Although the active operations 
duty does proceed "on the assumption that the blocks were the 
responsibility of the crew," 
Serbin introduced evidence that it was customary for longshoremen to 
remove hazardous 
conditions themselves (including those involving blocks and hatch covers) 
so as to unload the 
ship quickly and efficiently.  If this is true — as we must assume on 
summary judgment — the 
ship was on notice that a competent longshoreman, perhaps unable to 
ascertain that the block 
remained "down" because it was stuck, would attempt to move it. 
         McGonigle's testimony that he notified a member of the ship's 
crew of the 
problem is also not dispositive.  That another longshoreman notified a 
crew member of the 
block's incorrect position does nothing to establish that the ship took 
reasonable steps to 
rectify it.  McGonigle testified that he had no idea if the crew member 
would take care of the 
block — or indeed whether he even spoke English — and the record contains 
no evidence that 
the ship took any steps toward taking care of the block.  And even if the 
ship had a system in 
place, and had taken steps to move the block (or would have taken steps, 
given more time), 
these hypothetical factors cannot be enough to establish "reasonably 
precautionary or remedial 
measures" as long as the ship could reasonably foresee, as we have 
concluded that it could, 
that, despite such a system, a longshoreman might seek to correct the 
problem himself.  Under 
these circumstances, the ship was left with two options:  (1) inspecting 
and remedying 
dangerous conditions before the stevedore began cargo operations, or (2) 
making clear that 
longshoremen were not themselves to correct problems on the ship.  This 
record permits a 
reasonable inference that the ship did not do either.      
         The ship also argues that it could reasonably rely on Serbin to 
stop working 
pending the moving of the block because OSHA regulations require him to do 
so.  These 
regulations, the ship contends,  
         specifically state that when there is a problem with a hatch 
cover 
         "that would jeopardize the safety of the [longshoreman, the 
         problem] shall be reported at once to the officers in charge of 
the 
         vessel."  29 C.F.R. § 1918.31(c) (emphasis added).  
         Furthermore, the OSHA regulations state that "[p]ending 
         replacement or repairs by the vessel, work shall not be performed 
         in the section containing the unsafe covers or in adjacent 
sections 
         unless the flooring is made safe."  Id.  
         The problem with this argument is that it assumes one of the 
ultimate issues in 
this litigation:  Serbin's knowledge of the condition.  Because the 
regulations require reporting 
of "hatch cover" problems that would "jeopardize the safety" of 
longshoremen — rather than 
all "hatch cover" problems — Serbin would need to have knowledge of the 
block's dangerous 
condition in order to comply.  Serbin, of course, denies having such 
knowledge, and the ship 
introduced no evidence to the contrary.  Therefore, even assuming that a 
regulation governing 
"hatch covers" also covers "snatch blocks," this argument is unavailing.  
A fact-finder could 
reasonably conclude that the ship failed to take reasonable steps to 
rectify the block's 
condition. 
 
                         III.  CONCLUSION 
         Serbin has produced evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder 
could 
conclude that the ship breached its duty to him under section 5(b) of the 
Longshore Act.  We 
will, therefore, reverse the order of the district court granting summary 
judgment and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
